We show that variables pointed to by the theory of optimum currency areas (OCAs) help to explain patterns of exchange rate variability and intervention across countries. But OCA considerations affect exchange market pressures and intervention in different ways. Exchange market pressures mainly reflect asymmetric shocks, while intervention largely reflects the variables that OCA theory suggests cause countries to value stable exchange rates (small size and the extent of trade links). Intervention and exchange market pressure also vary with the structure of the international monetary system.
Introduction
Robert Mundell is rightly regarded as the father of the theory of optimum 1 currency areas. But the theory he spawned, while never lacking in patrimony, was for many years orphaned by the economics profession. Fig. 1 shows the number of articles with the phrase 'optimum currency areas' in the title for 5-year periods since 1961. Evidently, only in recent years with the impetus provided by the debate over European monetary unification has scholarship on this subject taken off.
Along with its time profile, a notable feature of this scholarship is the paucity of empirical work. Until recently, most contributions were theoretical, and to the extent that empirical work on exchange rate behavior and the choice of exchange rate regime acknowledged the predictions of OCA theory, it adopted a sceptical tone. The following conclusion due to Goodhart (1995, p. 452) can fairly be regarded as the consensus view.
The evidence therefore suggests that the theory of optimum currency areas has relatively little predictive power. Virtually all independent sovereign states have separate currencies, and changes in sovereign states lead rapidly to accompanying adjustments in monetary autonomy. The boundaries of states rarely coincide exactly with optimum currency areas, and changes in boundaries causing changes in currency domains rarely reflect shifts in optimum currency areas.
Here we suggest that this conclusion -especially the portion represented by the first sentence in the preceding quotation -is premature. In fact, the theory of optimum currency areas goes a long way toward accounting for the variability of exchange rates between separate national currencies. While Goodhart is right to conclude that the boundaries of political jurisdictions and currency areas almost always coincide, the variability of the exchange rates between the currencies circulating in those areas is largely explicable in terms of OCA theory.
We argue that the variables pointed to by the theory of optimum currency areas help to explain the behavior of the bilateral exchange rates (both nominal and real) on the grounds that the same factors that inform the decision of whether to form a currency union should also influence exchange rate behavior across countries. The evidence turns out to be strongly supportive of this hypothesis. Variables suggested by OCA theory -notably the importance of asymmetric disturbances to output and the intensity of trade links -have considerable explanatory power.
The conclusion that OCA variables can account for observed differences across countries in exchange rate variability leaves open the question of how this regularity comes about. It could arise because shocks to the foreign exchange market reflect OCA-related factors. Countries' bilateral rates are stable when the shocks they experience are similar, in other words. Alternatively, pressures could be the same, but governments could intervene more heavily to limit exchange-ratè variability vis-a-vis countries with whom OCA considerations loom large. When bilateral trade is relatively important, to cite one factor OCA theory suggests conduces to a preference for a stable bilateral rate, governments will intervene on the foreign exchange market to stabilize it.
The remainder of this paper seeks to differentiate between these explanations of the relationship between OCA variables and exchange rate variability. We construct measures of exchange rate variability and exchange market pressure (the latter designed to capture the magnitude of shocks to the foreign exchange market). The market pressure index is constructed using information on both exchange rate volatility and intervention. This provides an obvious opportunity to analyze the complementary relationship, namely the determinants of intervention itself.
We find that variables from the theory of optimum currency areas -principally, proxies for asymmetric shocks -go some way toward explaining variations across countries in exchange market pressure. Variables suggested by the theory of optimum currency areas also help to explain patterns of foreign exchange market intervention. But while exchange market pressures depend mainly on measures of the cost of an optimum currency area (that is, on variables measuring the extent of asymmetric shocks), intervention depends primarily on the benefits of an optimum currency area (on variables like country size the extent of bilateral trade links).
The overall conclusion is thus that variables pointed to by OCA theory appear to affect the behavior of bilateral exchange rates through both market conditions and intervention. But two sets of considerations pointed to by the OCA literature operate through different channels: asymmetric shocks are the main source of exchange market pressure, while proxies for the deterioration in the transactions value of money due to floating provide the main motivation for intervention.
Our approach has obvious points of contact with previous studies, although it departs from each of them. First there is the literature on the choice of exchange 2 rate regime (starting with Heller, 1978 rate variability. In addition, we take seriously the notion that exchange rate variability can in turn affect the country characteristics taken in these studies as determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime, and accordingly estimate our equations by instrumental variables.
We examine choice of exchange rate regime in a framework that allows us to consider systemic as well as country-specific factors. Previous work on this issue has proceeded country by country, ignoring changes in the structure of the international system and the implications of policy in neighboring countries. In the Bretton Woods period when major currencies were pegged, it made little difference from the point of view of an individual country whether to peg to one reserve currency or another since the rates between them varied so little. But once the dollar and DM began to float against one another, pegging to the DM meant floating against the dollar, and vice versa, complicating efforts to stabilize exchange rates. In contrast to previous work, we account for the entire network of bilateral exchange rate arrangements and not just individual country conditions 5 when modeling the choice of exchange rate regime.
While some previous work has also distinguished exchange market pressure 2 For surveys of the subsequent literature, see Savvides (1990 Savvides ( , 1993 . 3 Some authors, such as Dreyer (1978) and Melvin (1985) , consider more than two categories of exchange arrangements, distinguishing between freely floating currencies and those exhibiting limited flexibility, for example.
4 Actual exchange rate behavior should convey more information about underlying economic determinants than the putative exchange rate regime. Countries not only have to adopt an exchange rate regime, in other words, they also have to maintain it. The limited-dependent variable on which most previous investigators focus does not make use of all the information available in the variability of the exchange rate. 5 In addition, our study differs from most of its predecessors in that we employ data for the industrial countries rather than the developing world. Since the developing countries are more heterogeneous, the assumption of a common structure linking country characteristics to exchange rate variability is more problematic. Moreover, the industrial countries have tended to maintain more liberal external regimes and have thus been more dependent on market forces in determining their international economic policies. Finally, the choice of exchange rate regime has gained new urgency in the industrial world in the wake of the crisis in the European Monetary System and the debate over European monetary unification.
from intervention, we measure intervention in different ways. Glick et al. (1995) and Glick and Wihlborg (1997) measure intervention as the percentage change in international reserves as a fraction of the monetary base. Their index can be thought of as measuring by how much the money stock would have risen absent intervention. This is appropriate when the monetary authorities control bank balance sheets through base money (as they do in many countries where banking systems are tightly regulated). In many industrial countries, however, regulation of the domestic financial system is less comprehensive, and excess reserves can seep into the banking system via deposits. This suggests instead normalizing the percentage change in reserves by narrow money, as we do below. Alternatively we measure intervention as the percentage change in narrow money and by the change in the interest differential on the assumption that unsterilized intervention is used for managing exchange rates.
Exchange rate variability and exchange market pressure
The variability of nominal bilateral exchange rates for the 21 industrial countries in our sample is shown in Table 1 for three periods: 1963-1972, 1973-1982 and 6 1983-1992. Heavily shaded observations denote variability in excess of 8% per annum (the sample mean), lightly shaded entries moderate volatility (4-8%).
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There are no heavily-shaded entries for the 1960s. But in the 1970s the UK, the US, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have highly variable exchange 8 rates against virtually every country. The founding members of the Snake (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands) display lower-9 than-average variability vis-a-vis one another. While the non-Europeans continue to display relatively high levels of variability in the 1980s, the core members of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System - Table 1 The variability of nominal exchange rates Note: Nmenomics are: US5United States, JA5Japan, GR5Germany, AU5Austria, BE5Belgium, DE5Denmark, FI5Finland, GC5Greece, IR5Ireland, NT5The Netherlands, NZ5New Zealand, NO5Norway, PO5Portugal, SP5Spain, SW5Sweden.
Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands -10 display low volatility against one another and also the rest of the world. Table 1 conveys an impression of movement from a system of pegged exchange rates characterized by uniform behavior, through a transitional period in the 1970s when countries may not yet have arrived at their new preferred arrangement, to a new equilibrium in the 1980s in which the issuers of the major reserve currencies preferred to float but significant parts of Europe preferred to peg 11 against one another.
We can analyze exchange market pressure analogously, constructing a measure of the degree to which countries use changes in reserves to neutralize incipient exchange-rate movements. We measure intervention as: (21) (1)
where RES is reserves, NARROW is a measure of narrow money, and d is the difference operator. We normalize the change in reserves by narrow money on the assumption that this measures the incipient price level change that this change in reserves will generate. (Below we also replace (21), on the assumption that only unsterilized interven-12 tion is effective for managing exchange rates.) The shadow movement in the exchange rate between countries i and j then becomes:
10 Austria and Switzerland, neither of which belonged to the European Community nor participated in the ERM but maintained close economic relations with its core members, display similarly low levels of volatility.
11 That European core includes Switzerland and Austria, neither of which joined the EC during the sample period, but excludes the UK and Spain.
12 A potential concern is that the data may be dominated by outliers. Kurtosis is large for exchange rate changes in the 1960s and for changes in relative reserves in the 1980s. For the former this plausibly reflects the operation of the Bretton Woods System, under which exchange rates changed at discrete intervals rather than being continually determined by market forces. For intervention there are 19 observations for which normalized reserve flows exceed 25%. These include Australia in 1972 (associated with the breakup of the Bretton Woods System), Britain in 1977 (reflecting the 1976 sterling crisis and the IMF loan), Ireland in 1976 Ireland in -1977 Ireland in , 1987 Ireland in and 1992 (reflecting turbulence in the Snake and the ERM), Norway in 1984 Norway in -1986 Norway in , and 1989 (most of which can be explained by the exchange market effects of oil and natural gas production), Portugal in 1989 and 1991 (plausibly associated with impending ERM entry), and Finland and New Zealand in 1984 , 1986 and 1987 (at a time of instability in commodity markets). Overall, then, these extreme values appear to reflect significant economic events of a sort one would want to include in the analysis.
where EXCH is the exchange rate between countries i and j, measured such that a rise is an appreciation. Our measure of exchange market pressure thus adjusts actual exchange rate changes for the influence of intervention. Table 2 this list includes also Germany and Australia, indicating that intervention was successfully used in some cases to prevent exchange market pressure from spilling over into actual exchange rate movements.
Canada, Australia and New Zealand are principal countries with both highly variable exchange market pressure and highly variable exchange rates in the 1970s. The US, Japan and Britain appear to have experienced only low or moderate exchange market pressure; by implication, their variable exchange rates reflect a disinclination to intervene. The US-Canadian rate stands out for its low 13 level of exchange market pressure. A bloc of European countries subject to low levels of exchange market pressure is also evident; while it includes Snake members such as Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium, it also includes Spain, Sweden and Greece.
In the 1980s, the countries experiencing the most intense pressure are Canada, 14 Australia, Ireland, and New Zealand. In contrast to Table 1 , the US and Japan are absent from this list, again suggesting that the variability of their exchange rates reflects not so much exchange market pressure as limited intervention. Within Europe, the lowest levels of exchange market pressure are associated with the bilateral rates linking Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and (more surprisingly) Italy, Greece and Spain. Overall, Table 1 and Table 2 differ in two important respects. First, the variance of exchange market pressure rises over time, reflecting capital-market integration. This is in contrast to exchange rate variability, which rises in the 1970s and falls in 15 the 1980s. Second, the exchange market pressure faced by countries such as the US and Japan is not particularly high. High levels of exchange rate variability for these countries reflects their reticence to intervene rather than underlying pressures. Table 3 reports a measure of intervention equal to one minus stddev(d EXRATE) / stddev(d PRESSURE), where 'stddev' denotes the standard 13 Reflecting, presumably, the integration of the two economies. 14 In some cases this is due to the effect of a few large observations, as discussed earlier. 15 As before, this is our shorthand for the periods 1963-1972, 1973-1982 and 1983-1992. deviation. Intuitively, the more shocks to the foreign exchange market are absorbed by intervention, the lower the ratio of exchange rate variability to exchange market pressure. Heavy intervention (defined as an intervention index of over 0.85) are heavily shaded, medium levels of intervention (indexes between 0.7 and 0.85) lightly shaded.
By this measure, intervention was most prevalent in the 1960s, plausibly 17 reflecting the constraints of Bretton Woods. The introduction of generalized floating in the 1970s saw a dramatic fall in intervention, with almost no heavily shaded entries. Except for Europe and New Zealand, this pattern persists into the 1980s. In Europe commitments to stable exchange rates (either unilateral or through the ERM) produced heavy intervention.
Results
We now ask whether the variables pointed to by the theory of optimum currency 18 areas help to explain these patterns. As determinants of countries' choice of exchange-rate regime, that literature points to asymmetric disturbances, trade linkages, the usefulness of money for domestic transactions, and the extent of labor mobility. While the last of these characteristics is clearly important for adjustment within countries, it has not been particularly important for international adjustment in our sample period. Our empirical work therefore concerns itself exclusively with the first three factors. We measure asymmetric output disturbances as the standard deviation of the 19 change in the log of relative output. A second proxy for asymmetric shocks is the dissimilarity of the commodity composition of the exports (on the grounds that industry-specific shocks will be more symmetric when two countries have a 16 The 'one minus' formulation was used as the raw ratio has the somewhat counter-intuitive property that increased intervention reduces its value. Some earlier authors (Glick et al. (1995) and Glick and Wihlborg (1997) ) have used the variance of the exchange rate relative to the sum of the variance of the exchange rate and the variance of reserves as their measure of intervention. This assumes no covariance between the exchange rate and reserves. It is preferable in our view to calculate the pressure on the exchange rate as the percentage change in the bilateral exchange rate minus the percentage change in relative international reserves, following Girton and Roper (1977) . Reserve accumulations are thus treated as analogous to appreciation of the currency, reserve losses as analogous to depreciation. 17 The checker-board pattern of the entries show little systematic pattern, however, indicating that the net impact of intervention across bilateral linkages was relatively unpredictable (except in the case of Australia, where intervention appears to have been uniformly heavy across all trading partners).
18 Our earlier work indicates that optimum currency area variables provide a reasonably good explanation for observed patterns of exchange rate volatility, and that this explanatory power has been rising over time, although other non-OCA variables also matter (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997) . This section extends these earlier results to consider the relationship between OCA theory, exchange rate pressures and the use of intervention. 19 In the two countries. Thus, for countries in which business cycles are symmetric and national outputs move together, the value of this measure will be small. 20 comparative advantage in the same export industries). To measure the importance of trade linkages, we use the average value of exports to the partner country, scaled by GDP, for the two countries comprising each pair. We use country size to measure the reduction in the transactions value of the national currency due to floating rates; the costs of a common currency, in terms of macroeconomic policy independence foregone, should be balanced against the benefits, which will be greatest for small economies where there is least scope for utilizing a separate national currency in transactions. That is, small countries should benefit the most from the unit of account, means of payment, and store of value services of a common currency. As a measure of country size we include the arithmetic average 21 of (the log of) real GDP in US dollars of the two countries.
The estimating equation is:
where SD( y ) is the standard deviation of changes in bilateral exchange rates, of ij bilateral exchange market pressures, or of our index of intervention (one minus the ratio of the standard deviation of actual exchange rates to exchange market pressures), SD(Dy 2Dy ) is the standard deviation of the difference in the i j logarithm of real output between i and j, DISSIM is the sum of the absolute ij differences in the shares of agricultural, mineral, and manufacturing trade in total merchandise trade, TRADE is the mean of the ratio of bilateral exports to ij domestic GDP for the two countries, and SIZE is the mean of the logarithm of ij 22 the two GDPs measured in US dollars. The independent variables are measured as averages over 1963-1972, 1973-1982, or 1983-1992. 20 To construct this variable we collected data on the shares of manufactured goods, food and minerals in total merchandise trade for each country. Manufactured goods are defined as the total of basic manufactures, chemicals, machines and transport equipment, miscellaneous manufactured goods, and other goods. Food is the sum of food and live animals, beverages and tobacco, and animal, vegetable oils and fats. Minerals amalgamate data on crude materials excluding fuel with mineral fuels, etc. The dissimilarity of the commodity composition of two countries' exports was then defined as the sum of the absolute values of the differences in each share (with higher values indicating less similarity in the composition of commodity exports between the two countries). 21 An alternative, suggested by McKinnon (1963) , is to use openness to international trade as a measure of the benefits from stabilizing the exchange rate. However, economic size would appear to be a better measure of the benefits from a stable currency, as a comparison between the benefits provided by the national currencies of Germany (a large and relatively open economy) and Spain (a smaller and more closed economy) should make clear. To ensure that the exclusion of openness from the regression is not an important factor in the empirical results, we included openness in an extended regression discussed further below.
22 A potential technical concern with this specification is that not all of the entries for the dependent variable are independent of each other. However, while it is true that changes in bilateral rates are not independent (the change in the bilateral rate between the dollar and the yen is equal to the change between the dollar and the deutschemark and between the deutschemark and the yen), the standard deviations of these rates are independent as the covariances can differ across pairs of countries.
The extent of trade may depend on the variability of the exchange rate as well as influence policies toward it. Similarly, output variability may depend on the exchange rate regime in place. We therefore instrumented these two variables, drawing instruments from the gravity model (which seeks to explain the bilateral trade with whose endogeneity we are concerned): distance between the two 23 countries, contiguity, common language, and the size of the two economies.
The top panel of Table 4 shows the results for exchange rate variability, the middle panel for exchange market pressure, the bottom panel for intervention. The coefficients in the top panel generally enter with their anticipated signs, and nine of 12 differ from zero at standard confidence levels. Their significance and absolute value increase with time: aside from relative output variability (which, Standard errors are reported in parentheses. One and two asterisks indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 5% and 1% probability level, respectively, a plus significance at the 10% level. Constant terms are not reported. The instruments for variability of output are not reported. The instruments for variability of output and trade are distance, size of each economy, squares of variables, and dummy variables for a common border and common language. See the text for an explanation of the variables.
plausibly, has an especially large effect in the turbulent 1970s), they are largest in the 1980s, when they are all significant. They explain half of cross-section differences in exchange rate variability in the most recent decade, up from 10% in the 1960s. It would appear that the variables pointed to by the theory of optimum currency areas provide a better explanation for currency variability in the 1980s when countries were free to choose their preferred exchange-rate arrangement, than in the 1960s when they were heavily constrained by the rules of Bretton Woods, or than in the transitional 1970s.
The results in the middle panel also show a consistent pattern. Both proxies for asymmetric shocks are significantly and positively related to the variability of 24 exchange market pressure. Again there is some tendency for the coefficients to grow over time (especially that on output movements), plausibly reflecting the increased tendency for the exchange rate to respond to asymmetric shocks as markets have become more open.
The extent of intervention, analyzed in the third panel, appears to depend on our proxies for the benefits of a stable currency: country size and bilateral links (with smaller countries which trade more heavily with one another intervening more). This is the complement of the results for exchange market pressure, where the proxies for asymmetric shocks were consistently more important. Again, the coefficients rise over time (in absolute value), plausibly reflecting the opening of capital markets and hence the need for additional intervention to achieve the desired result.
In summary, our results suggest that asymmetric shocks increase exchange rate volatility by intensifying exchange market pressure, while small size and trade links reduce volatility by encouraging intervention. The factors to which OCA theory points as costs of a common currency tend to create exchange market pressure, while the factors to which it points as benefits of currency stability prompt intervention.
Sensitivity analysis
Measuring intervention as the (normalized) change in reserves may not be appropriate if intervention is unsterilized. We explored this possibility by adjusting currency variability for changes in money supply instead of changes in reserves. The results from reestimating the exchange-market pressure equations with this change in specification are in the top panel of Table 5 . Our OCA-related variables explain more of the variance in this measure of exchange-market pressure in the 1980s than the 1970s and the 1970s than the 1960s. The idea that 'OCA costs' For notes see Table 4 .
explain exchange market pressure while 'OCA benefits' explain intervention is less clearly supported: both sets of factors help to explain pressure in the 1980s, while neither goes very far toward explaining it in the 1960s. We also measured intervention a third way, as the change in the interest 206 T. Bayoumi, B. Eichengreen / Journal of International Economics 45 (1998) 191 -209 25 differential, to test for intervention not captured by changes in reported reserves. Our OCA specification works relatively well in the 1960s when intervention is measured using the interest differential, relatively well in the 1980s when intervention is measured using changes in the money supply, and relatively well in the 1970s under both specifications, perhaps reflecting gradual changes over time in the instruments utilized by central banks. Finally, we considered four variables suggested by the literature on choice of exchange arrangements and one measure of the international regime. To test whether capital controls provide significant insulation from exchange-market pressure, making it easier for countries to stabilize nominal rates, we included an indicator of their presence constructed from tabulations of restrictions on capitalaccount transactions published in the International Monetary Fund's Exchange and 26 Trade Restrictions volumes. As a measure of financial development we included the ratio of broad money to GDP (constructed as the average of the two countries money / GDP ratios). To capture the idea that more open economies will be more inclined to employ an external anchor, we included the average trade-to-GDP ratio 27 (where trade equals exports plus imports) for the two countries. (This variable was instrumented, since it should be endogenous for the same reasons as bilateral trade.) As a measure of asymmetric monetary disturbances, we included the average difference in the absolute change in the log of the money supply. Because neither openness or the growth of money supplies was statistically significant and economically important in any of the three decades' we dropped from the 28 specification reported in Table 5 .
Our measure of the international regime is the arithmetic average of the variability of the US dollar exchange rates of each country pair. This is designed to capture the idea that when the dollar was pegged governments were not forced tòt rade off stability vis-a-vis third currencies against stability vis-a-vis the dollar, 29 which should have increased the attractions of pegging to third countries.
The additional variables (none of which were instrumented) add little to the 2 explanatory power of the regression (as measured by the R ). The predictions of 25 We generally measured interest rates using the money market rate (and, where that was unavailable, the treasury bill rate) from the IMF's International Financial Statistics. Normalizing the interest differential in different ways (for example, using different estimates of the interest semielasticity of money demand) made little difference for the results; in the end we simply subtracted its level from the measure of exchange-rate variability. 26 Our measure of controls ranges from zero to six, with larger values indicating more comprehensive restrictions.
27 This is distinct from the tendency for two countries that trade disproportionately with one another to peg their exchange rate as a way of preventing exchange rate volatility from disrupting their commerce, a factor for which we have already controlled by including a measure of bilateral trade. 28 In particular, we find little evidence that more open economies are more inclined to peg, consistent with the findings of Honkapohja and Pikkarainen (1992) . 29 This variable takes on a value of zero when the US is one of the two partner countries.
OCA theory, in other words, provide as satisfactory an explanation for exchange market pressure as the extended model. Including the additional regressors does not much change the estimates of the four OCA variables, although their coefficients become somewhat less well defined. Still, a few of the new results are informative. Capital controls tend to be associated with lower exchange market pressure, consistent with the belief that they had significant insulating power, 30 especially in the 1960s and 1970s. And higher ratios of money to output are negatively associated with exchange-market pressure, significantly so in the 1960s, 31 as if financial markets in such countries are better able to absorb shocks. Results from our proxy for the exchange-rate regime suggest that the structure of the international system matters for countries' exchange rate policy. The 'system' variable is positive in all three decades but falls in size and significance over time, as if pressure on dollar exchange rates had a greater tendency to spill over into pressure on other bilateral rates in the 1960s and 1970s than in the 1980s (reflecting the declining dominance of the dollar as the anchor for the entire network of bilateral rates in the post-Bretton Woods years).
In the equations for actual exchange rate variability (not reported but available from the authors on request), the dollar rate entered positively and significantly in the 1960s and 1970s, and negatively and significantly in the 1980s. Our interpretation is as follows. Under the Bretton Woods System of pegged-butadjustable rates, stabilization against the dollar implied stabilization against other currencies; since countries with more stable dollar rates also had more stable rates vis-a-vis other currencies, the coefficient on the 'system' variable is positive. Similarly, in the turbulent 1970s, the dollar remained a center for monetary stability. In the 1980s, however, the emergence of Germany as an alternative center of monetary gravity to which other industrial countries, especially in Europe, might peg forced them to choose between stability against the dollar and stability against the mark. Because the US and German currencies fluctuated widely against one another, stabilizing the exchange rate against one anchor currency meant accepting greater variability against the other, with stability against the mark being achieved in Europe through extensive intervention despite the continuing underlying role of the dollar. Hence, the coefficient on our 'system' variable is negative in this regression. This is evidence, then, that not just country characteristics but also the structure of the international system matters for countries' choice of exchange rate regime.
Overall, then, the results of estimating the extended model point in the same 30 When we added these same regressors to the equations for the variability of the actual exchange rate and intervention, we found that capital controls were negatively and significantly associated with exchange-rate variability but never significantly associated with intervention, consistent with this interpretation.
31 Consistent with this interpretation, the money / GDP ratio had a significant negative coefficient in the 1960s in the equation for the variability of the actual rate but not the equation for intervention. direction as the simple OCA specification. Exchange market pressures largely reflect the magnitude of asymmetric shocks ('OCA costs'), while intervention is driven by the value attached to stable exchange rates ('OCA benefits'). The additional variables do, however, point to some further factors at work. Exchange market pressures also depend upon an economy's financial structure, in particular the level of capital controls and the depth of financial markets. And the results point to the continued importance of the US dollar for the operation of the international system. Exchange market pressure is positively associated with shocks to the dollar exchange rate, although the magnitude of this effect falls over time, presumably reflecting the declining dominance of the United States in the international economy.
Conclusions
In this paper we have attempted to link the theory of optimum currency areas to the exchange rates of the industrial countries. Contrary to the presumption informing much of the literature, we find that variables to which the theory points have considerable explanatory power. Countries with more variable exchange rates are subject to larger asymmetric shocks. Those with more stable rates suffer the greatest reduction in the transaction value of the domestic currency when their exchange rates vary, due to their small size and dependence on trade. While asymmetric shocks increase exchange rate variability by magnifying exchange market pressure (by disturbing underlying market conditions, in other words), small size and trade dependence reduce exchange rate variability by prompting intervention. These findings, which we take as the core implications of the theory of optimum areas, are strongly supported by the data.
